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Abstract: For 15 years, former assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky used 
his Penn State University perquisites to lure young and fatherless boys by 
offering them special access to one of the most revered football programs in 
the country. He repeatedly used the football locker room as a space to groom, 
molest, and rape his victims. In February 2001, an eye-witness alerted Penn 
State's top leaders that Sandusky was caught sexually assaulting a young boy 
in the showers. Instead of taking swift action against Sandusky, leaders 
began a cover-up that is considered one of the worst scandals in sports 
history. While public outcry has focused on the leaders' silence, we focus on 
the talk that occurred within the organization by key personnel. Drawing from 
court documents and internal investigative reports, we examine two 
euphemism clusters that unfolded in the scandal. The first cluster comprises 
reporting euphemisms, in which personnel used coded language to report the 
assault up the chain of command. The second cluster comprises responding 
euphemisms, in which Penn State's top leaders relied on an innocuous, but 
patently false, interpretation of earlier euphemisms as a decision-making 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 114, No. 4 (June 2013): pg. 551-569. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer. 
2 
 
framework to chart their course of (in)action. We use this case to 
demonstrate how euphemistic language impairs ethical decision-making, 
particularly by framing meaning and visibility of acts, encouraging mindless 
processing of moral considerations, and providing a shield against 
psychological and material consequences. Further, we argue that euphemism 
may serve as a disguised retort to critical upward communication in 
organizations.  
 
Keywords: ambiguity, critical upward communication, decision-making, 
ethics, euphemism, language, leadership, sexual abuse  
 
In October 2012, former Penn State University assistant football 
coach Jerry Sandusky was sentenced to 30 to 60 years behind bars for 
the sexual abuse of ten boys (Levs & Dolan, 2012). Court reports show 
that for 15 years, Sandusky used his Penn State perquisites to lure 
young and fatherless boys by offering them tickets to football games, 
travel to bowl games, and special access to one of the most revered 
football programs in the country. He also used keys to the football 
program's facilities—including the locker room—to access spaces 
where he groomed, molested, and raped his victims. Although sexual 
assault against children is heinous enough on its own accord, what 
made the case arguably the worst scandal in sports history was the 
decade-long organizational cover-up that ran concurrently with 
Sandusky's pattern of abuse.  
 
After the incidents of sexual assault came to light in November 
2011, public outcry not only was directed against Sandusky, but also 
against Penn State's top leaders: university president Graham Spanier, 
senior vice president of finance and business Gary Schultz, athletic 
director Timothy Curley, and legendary head football coach Joseph 
Paterno. The central grievance was that these leaders were alerted to 
Sandusky's reprehensible behavior, concealed the facts, quashed 
proper criminal investigation, and protected the football program from 
bad publicity instead of protecting innocent and vulnerable children 
from further sexual abuse (Freeh, 2012). In fact, the cover-up, which 
began in 1998, has been argued to be a contributing factor to the 
prolonged nature of abuse and the expanded circle of Sandusky's 
victims (Freeh, 2012; Moushey & Dvorchak, 2012).  
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Much has been written already about the scandal: failures of 
leadership (Candiotti, Levs, & Ariosto, 2012; Wolverton, 2012), an 
organizational culture that privileged football over all else (Elvasky, 
2012; Gregory & Webley, 2011), reliance on market values instead of 
educational values for structuring decision-making (Giroux & Giroux, 
2012; Proffitt & Corrigan, 2012), and a code of silence that protected 
the university from bad publicity (Gutierrez & McLaren, 2012; Moushey 
& Dvorchak, 2012). Throughout nearly all popular and scholarly 
critiques, the question asked is, "Why didn't anyone speak up?" While 
it is true that Penn State personnel did not communicate suspected 
crimes to proper authorities, they were talking. What they were saying 
and how they were saying it played a pivotal role in how the situation 
unfolded, turning a "normal crime" into an organizational scandal 
(Altheide & Johnson, 2012).  
 
In this essay, we foreground organizational talk about the 
accusations of abuse, focusing on language choices made by Penn 
State personnel and the resultant ethical consequences. By language 
choices, we refer to "discursive moves" that occur in several ways, 
including deliberate planning to gain control over meaning making in a 
particular context, spontaneous use of language that emerges through 
dialogue over time, and intentional reuse of specific language from 
previous emergent moves deemed successful (Moldoveanu, 2009). 
Therefore, while we cannot make claims as to the intentionality of the 
use of euphemism by Penn State personnel, we examine the ways in 
which euphemism ultimately was embedded in its particular context 
and functioned to shape reality and influence decision making (see 
Larsson & Lundholm, 2010). Specifically, we draw from court 
documents and investigative reports to trace how euphemistic 
language was used throughout the case and ensuing cover-up. We 
examine two euphemism clusters that unfolded in the scandal. The 
first cluster comprises reporting euphemisms, in which personnel used 
coded language to report the assault up the chain of command. The 
second cluster comprises responding euphemisms, in which Penn 
State's top leaders relied on an innocuous, but patently false, 
interpretation of earlier euphemisms as a decision-making framework 
to chart their course of (in)action. Ultimately, we assert that even 
though the horrific acts that took place on Penn State's campus were 
discussed internally, the interpersonal and organizational euphemisms 
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used to report and respond to accusations of sexual abuse—
particularly the expression "horsing around"— impaired ethical 
decision-making, particularly by framing meaning and visibility of acts, 
encouraging mindless processing of moral considerations, and 
providing a shield against psychological and material consequences. 
We argue that euphemism may serve as a disguised retort to critical 
upward communication in organizations.  
 
This article is organized as follows. To begin, we provide 
background on critical upward communication in organizations. From 
there, we review relevant literature on euphemism and explain how 
euphemism can contribute to making and justifying poor ethical 
choices. Next, we explain the methods we used to build and analyze 
the case. Then, we present our findings, starting with a brief summary 
of the communicative history of the Penn State sexual abuse scandal. 
We then expand on two main euphemism clusters: reporting 
euphemisms, those used by eye witnesses to report up the chain of 
command; and responding euphemisms, those used by key leaders 
during the (in)action that followed in subsequent years of the cover-
up. Our findings offer important contributions to organizational 
euphemism research and implications for business ethics practice.  
 
Critical Upward Communication and Ethics  
 
While managers may espouse their appreciation for feedback 
from subordinates, that welcoming environment tends to apply more 
to good news than bad. Tourish and Robson (2006) explain that the 
prospect of sharing good news carries low-risk and high-reward. 
Therefore, subordinates are encouraged to share positive news up the 
chain of command and there is a strong upward flow of positive 
information. However, the converse is true as well. When the 
information a subordinate communicates is critical of management or 
includes information, however factual, that is antithetical to 
organizational goals or priorities, the message is far less well-received, 
creating a situation where sharing it carries high-risk and low-reward. 
Therefore, negative upward communication often is stifled and the flow 
is weak. Tourish and Robson refer to negative information that is 
transmitted by those without managerial power to those with such 
power as critical upward communication.  
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Research has shown that subordinates often are fearful of 
engaging in critical upward communication, with some of the most 
cited reasons for remaining silent being fear of being labeled as a 
troublemaker, concern for ruining relationships, fear of being 
punished, or concern about the organizational hierarchy or climate 
(Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003). These concerns are not irrational. 
Organizations often penalize employees or resort to other kinds of 
behaviors that discourage employees from expressing dissent (Seeger 
& Ulmer, 2003; Tourish & Robson, 2006; Waldron & Kassing, 2011). 
But particularly in the case of problem-focused voice—which is an 
employee's expression of concern about work practices, incidents, or 
behaviors regarded as (potentially) harmful to the organization 
(Morrison, 2011)—speaking up can be constructive and benefit an 
organization in its decision-making.  
 
When employees choose to share critical upward communication 
(which can be viewed as a form of dissent; see Kassing, 2011), how 
they express that information matters (Garner, 2012). Hierarchical 
relationships and face-management needs have a strong influence on 
how upward communication occurs in workplace settings. First, formal 
command structures in organizations (e.g., hierarchical supervisor-
subordinate relationships) prescribe certain expectations for the form 
and content of communication (see Bisel, Messersmith, & Kelley, 
2012), thereby fixing authority, acquiescence, and compliance (Bisel, 
Kelley, Ploeger, & Messersmith, 2011). Also, because of the power the 
supervisor holds over the subordinate, the stakes are higher for the 
subordinate to protect the relationship. Second, communicators tend 
to protect the face needs of conversational partners. In the case of 
negative messages, face needs are heightened as the content of the 
message typically are inherently face-threatening. But in the case of 
negative messages that also carry ethical implications, the face threats 
are heightened even further, as there may be an implied threat that 
the recipient is unethical. Therefore, there is a tendency to prioritize 
relationships by softening hurtful truths. A "moral mum effect" occurs 
when a communicator avoids describing a behavior in ethical terms or 
raising a moral objection to protect another's face needs (Bisel et al., 
2011) and a "hierarchical mum effect" occurs when a subordinate 
engages in silence or equivocation in deference to a supervisor (Bisel 
et al., 2012).  
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More than simply softening the critical upward communication, 
these mum effects have important consequences for ethics. While Bisel 
et al. (2012) studied the ways in which subordinates failed to label 
unethical requests from superiors as unethical, their findings have 
import for critical upward communication that concerns ethical 
problems, as ethical issues are one of the key issues subordinates 
reported being unable to raise to superiors (Milliken et al., 2003). By 
not drawing attention to ethical concerns within a critical message, it 
creates a rhetorical absence that assigns a benign meaning to 
something potentially unethical and creates barriers to morally-
informed decision making.  
 
Euphemism and Ethics  
 
At the outset, we note that our ethical position is informed by 
deontology. Deontological ethics asserts agents are responsible to 
uphold moral duties, including positive duties to do good and negative 
duties to avoid doing harm. Particular to the Penn State sexual abuse 
scandal, the ethical duties of the situation would be to take actions 
that remove victims from harm's way and prevent future abuse, as 
well as avoid actions that could put victims at further risk. While we 
acknowledge the actions taken by Penn State's leaders to handle the 
situation internally and not involve outside authorities could be viewed 
as ethical under a different frame (e.g., ethical egoism is the belief 
that agents should always act in their own best interest), in this article 
we judge the ethicality of actions and language choices by the extent 
to which they enabled and constrained the ability of agents to uphold 
positive and negative moral duties to the children abused by 
Sandusky.  
 
Also, while we recognize that talk, decisions, and actions are not 
the same thing—"to talk is one thing; to decide is a second; to act is 
yet a third" (Brunsson, 2007, p.112), we take the view that language 
provides a frame that influences how decisions are made and 
ultimately what actions are taken or not taken. As Bisel and colleagues 
(2011) asserted, communication is complicit in organizational ethics as 
"communication itself is the behavior that imbues workplace (ethical or 
unethical) behavior with value" (p. 154). In organizational contexts, 
discursive moves shape realities for actors (Knights & Willmott, 1992; 
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Larsson & Lundholm, 2010; see also speech act theory, Austin, 1962). 
By foregrounding communication in our analysis, we recognize that 
language is a basic ontological condition (see Ashcraft, Kuhn & Cooren, 
2009; Bisel, 2010) necessary for producing social reality (Rorty, 1967) 
and that actors draw upon established vocabularies when making 
sense of events (Rorty, 1989; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
Once organizational actors arrive at a consensually-constructed 
meaning of a particular event, their shared meaning "serves as a 
springboard to action" (Taylor & Van Every, 2000, p. 40). For our 
purposes, we focus on euphemism as the shared vocabulary that was 
drawn upon to make sense of accusations of abuse and coordinate 
organizational activity in response.  
 
Euphemism is one of the oldest and most recognizable forms of 
language, having existed throughout human history (Allan & Burridge, 
1991). Put simply, euphemism is "a word or phrase that is considered 
a more polite manner of referring to a topic than its literal designation" 
(McGlone, Beck, & Pfiester, 2006, p. 266). Common euphemisms in 
everyday situations include "using the restroom" rather than 
"urinating," and "he passed away" rather than "he died." In the 
business world, ostensibly more gentle terms soften painful or 
distasteful experiences: in job loss situations, managers describe the 
process of "right sizing" instead of firing people; in corporations, 
accountants speak of "pro forma financial statements" instead of 
"making your own accounting rules" (Stein, 1998; Tenbrunsel & 
Messick, 2004).  
 
At a basic level, euphemism can serve positive ends. To begin, it 
is one means by which communicators demonstrate context-
dependent sensibility and tact tailoring messages to various audiences 
(Fahnestock, 2011). Most frequently, inoffensive or pleasant terms are 
substituted for topics that are considered taboo or stigmatized in 
society—especially those related to sex, body parts, and bodily 
functions (Slovenko, 2001, 2005). For instance, excusing oneself from 
a dinner party to "use the restroom" is a polite way to omit unpleasant 
details about the reason for the absence. Euphemism also serves the 
purpose of minimizing face threat for speakers and their interlocutors 
(McGlone & Batchelor, 2003). Because people who discuss taboo topics 
run the risk of being negatively judged (e.g., impolite, inappropriate), 
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they may mitigate some of that negative judgment by downplaying 
their choice of topic with less offensive language (McGlone et al., 
2006). Likewise, euphemism can be used to avoid offending the 
sensibilities of addressees, especially if they somehow are invoked by 
or affected by a taboo topic. Finally, communicators can draw upon 
euphemism to talk about unpleasant and unspeakable topics in ways 
that they may not have been able to without such substitutes. For 
example, in her study of Latina women's accounts of sexual violence in 
a legal setting, Trinch (2001) found that women often do not use the 
vivid word "rape" to describe what happened, but instead opt for 
euphemistic terms that still are descriptive enough to define the act. 
As such, euphemism holds the possibility of helping people to 
overcome inhibitions of talking about unpleasant topics (McGlone et 
al., 2006) and, therefore, open a space for dialogue.  
 
But euphemism is not merely a polite form of talk; it is a 
powerful language tool or "injurious weapon" (Bandura, 1999, p. 195) 
that can have profound consequences (Stein, 1998). Euphemism can 
alter the visibility and meaning of the phenomena it signifies—which 
consequently can impede individuals from having full understanding of 
the gravity and moral implications of a situation. It can function in a 
metaphor-like fashion to frame personal and organizational decision-
making, providing a way to short-circuit critical thinking and facilitate 
mindless decision-making without regard to ethical implications 
(Burgoon & Langer, 1995; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). It also can 
provide a shield behind which individuals can justify and/or deny their 
actions and silence reservations about moral wrongdoing (MacKenzie, 
2000).  
 
Changing Meanings and Visibility of the Signified  
 
Euphemism raises ethical concerns because of its ability to cast 
behaviors, deeds, and events in ways that provide more favorable 
meanings. Given that euphemism is the replacement of repugnant 
language with more neutral terms (Stein, 1998), it serves to reason 
that euphemism can change the very meaning attached to the 
phenomenon it is meant to signify. Bandura (1999) maintains that 
"activities can take on very different appearances depending on what 
they are called" (p. 195). For instance, managers who terminate 
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employees are not cutting off paychecks and medical benefits without 
notice; they are "right sizing" their organizations. Mortgage lenders 
who sell subprime mortgages are not financially devastating families 
who cannot afford home ownership; they are "helping people get a 
piece of the American Dream" (for further discussion of several 
common euphemisms, see Bandura, 1999). In this sense, euphemism 
is more than just a face-saving way to broach an unpleasant act, but a 
way to make the act itself less unpleasant (McGlone et al., 2006; 
McGlone & Batchelor, 2003; Stein, 1998). Through euphemism, 
distasteful activities can lose their repugnancy, harmful conduct can be 
made respectable, and that which is socially unacceptable can be 
transformed into something socially approved (Bandura, 1999; Stein, 
1998). This kind of meaning-making is part of the rationale behind 
McGlone et al.'s (2006) assertion that "we often use euphemisms to 
tell it like it isn't" (p. 261).  
 
In addition to changing the meaning of a signified event (i.e., 
how an event is seen), euphemism can alter its visibility (i.e., the 
extent to which an event can be seen at all). Just as excusing oneself 
to "use the restroom" makes invisible (or at least less visible) bodily 
functions associated with that activity, euphemism has the power to 
background, conceal, and mask a variety of different deeds and 
behaviors (Stein, 1998). McGlone et al. (2006) describe euphemism as 
camouflage, saying, "euphemism succeeds as a discourse strategy in 
the same manner camouflage succeeds in its military mission—by 
rendering its subject as inconspicuous as possible in the surrounding 
context" (p. 263). Another way camouflaging alters the visibility of 
certain events is by affecting the extent to which events are 
remembered. McGlone et al. (2006) conducted a study that showed 
that when conventional, familiar euphemisms are used to describe a 
taboo event—as compared to describing the same event with an 
unfamiliar euphemism or with a non-euphemistic, literal description—
subjects had a lower rate of recall for the taboo event. Put simply, it 
was easier to forget an event when it was described in euphemistic 
terms. It should not be surprising then that when euphemisms become 
commonplace (e.g., "creative accounting," "right sizing"), people no 
longer see the questionable behavior they were designed to disguise 
(Stein, 1998). When euphemism conceals truth that ought not remain 
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concealed, ethical problems arise (Gruner, Travillion, & Schaefer, 
1991).  
 
Framing Action and Encouraging Mindless Decision-
Making  
 
Language is a central mechanism for framing thinking, action, 
and decision-making (Bandura, 1999). Stein (1998) argues that 
euphemism "is as much a hard fact in decision making as are hard 
numbers" (p. 4). Euphemism can be a catalyst for unethical decision-
making as it can hide ethical concerns, encourage mindless processing 
of decisions, and then commit those decisions into institutional 
memory, setting precedent for future (unethical) decisions to be made.  
 
As described above, euphemism can alter the meaning and 
visibility of situations in such a way that ethical considerations are 
hidden from view. When this kind of reframing or sanitizing occurs, 
"we avoid the complexity inherent in ethical dilemmas and short-circuit 
our decision-making process" (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p. 228). 
Commonplace expressions, such as euphemism, can trigger 
mindlessness (see Burgoon & Langer, 1995) and consequently 
decrease the quality and ethicality of decision-making. Instead of 
making thoughtful decisions marked by careful deliberation of ethical 
considerations and moral responsibilities, decision makers rely on 
heuristic reasoning, snap judgments, and/or generalizations (Burgoon 
& Langer, 1995; McGlone et al., 2006). Furthermore, as decisions 
become highly routinized based on past practices in organizations and 
organizational members become psychologically numbed by repetition 
of words, phrases, and the meanings and actions they generate, the 
propensity for critical evaluation and thoughtful deliberation decreases 
even further. Mindless decision-making processes can get entrenched 
even deeper as euphemism-laced accounts become commonplace and 
unethical practices become "thoughtlessly routinized" (Bandura, 1999, 
p. 203).  
 
Providing a Shield for One's Actions  
 
Just as euphemism can be used as a framework to make 
decisions, it also can be used as a way to justify and/or deny decisions 
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already made or actions already taken. When unethical action already 
has occurred, euphemism provides a shield to protect individuals from 
the psychological consequences of those actions. Instead of 
acknowledging the possibility that an individual is not an ethical 
person, dealing with a host of negative emotions for having done 
wrong, and/or exposing oneself to repercussions for unethical 
decision-making, euphemism can be used to distance people from the 
role they played in immoral conduct and attempt to reduce personal 
responsibility for that action (Bandura, 1999; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 
2004).  
 
Stein (1998) explains that when unethical actions are taken, 
"things cannot and must not be called, or felt, what they are. To do so 
would bring on overwhelming guilt, anxiety, and remorse" (p. 30). 
Therefore, there is a tendency for individuals to engage in self-
deception—a lack of awareness or acknowledgement that one is 
behaving unethically—as a way to reduce the dissonance experienced 
when there is a disconnect between their actions and identity 
(MacKenzie, 2000; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (2004) coin the term "ethical fading" to describe the 
psychological process by which ethical decisions are "bleached" of their 
moral implications, and outline the role of euphemisms in this process. 
Euphemism, by reframing meaning in more favorable terms or by 
rendering the ethics of the act invisible, function as an "ethical bleach" 
that washes out ethical implications. In this way, euphemisms act as 
"powerful tricksters" and "disguised stories" that can shield people 
from the motives for and consequences of their own actions (Stein, 
1998; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004). MacKenzie (2000) points to a 
dramatic example of this phenomenon. Adolph Eichmann, a key leader 
in the Holocaust, portrayed himself as innocent through the use of 
euphemisms. He drew heavily from the Third Reich's Language Rules, 
"which were the required use of euphemisms and code terms for 
killings and brutalities" (MacKenzie, 2000, p. 32). This example points 
to the utility of euphemism for recasting a narrative that is voided of 
ethical concerns and, once a narrative is neutralized, for distancing 
oneself psychologically from the consequences of actions and 
decisions.  
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In addition to psychological protection, euphemism also can act 
as a shield against material consequences of one's actions and 
decisions. Euphemisms, by their very nature, are ambiguous 
expressions. Whereas ambiguity can serve positive purposes (e.g., 
creating a space for unified diversity; see Eisenberg, 1984), it also can 
serve unethical ends. In particular, ambiguity created by euphemism 
can be used to escape blame, avoid responsibility, and create plausible 
deniability (Paul & Strbiak, 1997). For instance, plausible deniability 
makes it much more difficult to meet requirements for establishing 
burden of proof (Walton, 1996), which can dramatically influence 
outcomes of court cases. Regardless of whether the meaning of a 
signified phenomenon is understood, individuals can feign ignorance of 
a given situation by claiming they relied on alternative meanings of the 
euphemism in question. In this regard, people who have engaged in 
unethical behavior can be protected from material consequences such 
as criminal and civil liability and, therefore, not have to be held 
accountable for unethical actions.  
 
In sum, euphemism can serve unethical, if not downright 
dangerous, ends. Euphemism has been described as exerting "a 
corrosive influence on communicative clarity" (McGlone et al., 2006, p. 
276). In organizations, "bureaucratic-style euphemisms" are 
considered a form of deceptive organizational communication, which 
conceal or neutralize embarrassing and/or unpleasant deeds in 
attempts at "willful perversion of the truth" (Redding, 1996, p. 30). 
Euphemism can be used to reframe less-than-desirable phenomena as 
socially acceptable, to render ethical concerns invisible, to encourage 
mindless decision-making, and to justify and/or deny ethically 
questionable actions. It should not be surprising then that euphemism 
has been described as an "injurious weapon" (Bandura, 1999, p. 195) 
and a "form of violence" (Stein, 1998, p. 7). The injury and violence 
that can be leveraged by euphemism is vividly illustrated in the Penn 
State sexual abuse scandal, throughout which Penn State personnel 
reported and responded to accusations of child sexual abuse with 
euphemistic language.  
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Method  
 
In this essay, we present a narrative of Penn State's internal 
communication that unfolded surrounding the Sandusky scandal. While 
there have been countless news reports and opinion pieces on the 
scandal—many of which have suggested evidence of an organizational 
cover-up—we base our analysis on the texts that most closely 
represent the original communicative exchanges between key 
personnel. These include the grand jury presentments which comprise 
summary testimony from victims, witnesses, and Penn State personnel 
called to testify, released in November 2011 (GJ1-2); Centre County 
court transcripts from Sandusky's criminal hearing in June 2012 (CC1-
CC11); and Dauphin County court transcripts from Schultz and 
Curley's combined preliminary hearing on perjury and failure to report 
charges from December 2011 (DC). We also analyzed the Freeh 
Report, which is the 267-page commissioned investigative report 
released in July 2012 (FR), which includes copies of emails, meeting 
notes, handwritten notes between university leaders, typewritten 
correspondence, and other internal communication. In total, we 
combed through more than 2,500 pages of reports and transcripts. 
See Table 1 for complete citations of documents quoted in the 
analysis.  
 
Also, given that Paterno testified in court only once before his 
death in January 2012, we turn to his posthumously published 
biography, Paterno (Posnanski, 2012), to provide further detail of what 
he may have said or heard about reports of sexual abuse by 
Sandusky. Because biographies present subjective and personal 
accounts of experiences (Schwandt, 2007), we took special precaution 
in drawing from Paterno's biography as a data source. We included in 
our case analysis only Paterno's recollections of his conversation with 
McQueary and excluded any of Posnanski's interpretation or personal 
insights that extended beyond the scope of Paterno's conversations 
with Penn State personnel. Given the brief conversations reported by 
Posnanski are consistent with Paterno's testimony to the grand jury, 
we judged the information as trustworthy.  
 
The first phase of analysis was identifying the core data to be 
analyzed. We began this process by reading the documents in their 
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entirety to gain a holistic sense of the case—including the entirety of 
the criminal proceedings against Sandusky. Then, we uploaded the 
documents into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software program 
that aids in data coding and retrieval (Weitzman & Miles, 1995) and 
can be used as a tool for data reduction. In this step, we winnowed the 
data (Wolcott, 1994) by coding each passage that represented a 
communicative exchange involving Penn State personnel, including 
codes for details such as parties involved, communication channel, and 
content of message. We paid particular attention to recollections of 
conversations between personnel, email messages, and other internal 
written records. The winnowing process significantly reduced the data 
by removing the bulk of testimony surrounding details of the sexual 
assaults, leaving a condensed dataset centered on Penn State's 
internal communication.  
 
The next major phase of the analysis was building a time-
ordered display matrix (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Because of the flow 
of court proceedings, the chronology of events is not readily apparent 
simply by reading transcripts. For instance, a single witness typically 
provides initial testimony, is cross-examined, and then responds to a 
redirect. In each segment of questioning, events can be addressed 
multiple times and out of sequence. Additional witnesses each have a 
turn addressing the same sequence of events or different events that 
occurred before, during, and/or after other events previously described 
in testimony. Therefore, there is a "circling-back" pattern to testimony 
that creates overlapping and out-of-sequence timeline segments. 
Likewise, the organization of the Freeh Report was ordered in such a 
way that many of the appendices (including copies of internal 
communication) were not presented in chronological order. 
Furthermore, sources revealed unique information about different 
communicative exchanges, requiring that evidence be merged from 
multiple sources into a single timeline. Therefore, we reorganized all 
coded passages from all sources into a matrix that was ordered by 
date of occurrence and listed all details (quotations, communicators, 
citation information) for each utterance.  
 
The final phase of analysis involved analyzing the time-ordered 
display as a text. We read through the data looking for patterns in the 
communicative exchanges. This process involved iterative processes of 
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coding for deeper meaning (e.g., recurrent phrases, emotional states) 
and theoretical memoing that captured impressions and established 
connections between codes (Lindlof & Taylor, 2011). We also 
contextualized the data by returning to original sources to gather 
additional details surrounding exchanges. Following the outline 
provided by time-ordered display and in light of the key findings of our 
language-based analysis, we reconstruct the case below, framing the 
retelling with a particular focus on the communicative handling of the 
case rather than the abuse itself.  
 
As a caveat, we must note that because the accounts presented 
here are drawn primarily from court transcripts, the accuracy of these 
recollections is debatable—especially considering that Curley, Schultz, 
and Spanier are facing charges of perjury. Additionally, some of the 
language used throughout the hearings likely resulted from coaching 
by attorneys (both for the prosecution and defense) and/or the 
language culture of the courtroom; likewise, some of language used in 
the unfolding of the case may have resulted from advice by university 
counsel.1 Yet, there appears to be striking agreement between parties 
about the essence of what was said and not said, particularly in regard 
to the euphemisms favored by all parties. While we cannot speculate 
on what language was shaped by the legal system, we do compensate 
for the limitation of retrospective accounts by presenting all available 
recollections of specific conversations.  
 
A Communicative History of the Penn State Scandal  
 
The grand jury presentments and criminal trial testimony 
against Jerry Sandusky contain lurid and heart-wrenching details of 
more than a decade of sexual assaults against young boys, many of 
which occurred on Penn State's campus and/or in association with the 
school's football program. The point of this essay is not to rehearse the 
charges of abuse, but instead to show how key leaders in the Penn 
State system communicated about the abuse of which they were 
aware. Based on court testimony and the independent investigation, 
there are three known incidents that came to the attention of Penn 
State staff and administrators. In May 1998, a woman reported to 
Penn State police department that Sandusky had showered with her 
11 year-old son and touched him inappropriately (i.e., hugging and 
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lifting him up while both were naked). A campus police investigation 
was launched, but no formal charges were filed (FR, pp. 41-47). In fall 
2000, janitor Jim Calhoun relayed to coworkers that he had witnessed 
Sandusky performing oral sex on a young boy in the showers. At the 
time, coworkers convinced Calhoun not to report the abuse up the 
chain of command for fear that they would lose their jobs (FR, pp. 65-
66). Then, on February 9, 2001, graduate assistant Michael McQueary 
witnessed Sandusky sexually assaulting a young boy in the football 
locker room. His reporting of the incident to Paterno, and eventually to 
Curley and Schultz, initiated a chain of (in)action that is at the center 
of the trials. Therefore, it is communication about this third incident 
that is the focus of our analysis.  
 
Horsing Around: Euphemism and Inaction at Penn 
State  
 
One of the key contentions throughout the criminal trials is the 
extent to which Penn State leaders knew about what happened in the 
showers. While it is agreed by all parties that McQueary had reported 
some sort of incident, there is debate as to what exactly he had 
reported. The interpretations range from McQueary's account of sexual 
intercourse with a minor to Curley, Schultz, and Spanier's account of 
Sandusky simply "horsing around." Below, we trace the evolution of 
euphemisms up the chain of command and then ultimately used by 
Penn State's top leaders to chart their course of (in)action.  
 
There were two central euphemism clusters. The first cluster of 
reporting euphemisms was used to describe the sexual assault 
witnessed by McQueary and how his observation was reported to Penn 
State leaders. The second cluster of responding euphemisms deals 
with language used by Curley, Schultz, and Spanier in their 
organizational response to disciplining Sandusky and deciding not to 
report to authorities for further action, but instead to bar "guests" 
from using university facilities. See Table 2 for a summary. Here, we 
provide more detail of the sequence of events by examining the 
specific language used in the reporting. Euphemisms are marked in 
italics and should not be interpreted as emphasis of text, unless 
specifically noted.  
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Reporting Euphemisms: Moving Bad News Up the Chain 
of Command  
 
In February 2001, McQueary entered the Penn State football 
locker room late on a Friday night. According to court testimony he 
instantly was alerted to the presence of other people by the sounds of 
running water and "skin-on-skin smacking sounds" (CC4, p. 192). 
Although flustered, he looked into the showers and witnessed "Coach 
Sandusky's arms wrapped around the boy's midsection in the very, 
very, very—the closest proximity that I think you could be in" (CC4, 
pp. 193-194). He slammed his locker door shut as loudly as possible to 
alert Sandusky to his presence and in an attempt to communicate 
"Someone is here. Break it up. Please" (CC4, p. 198). McQueary and 
Sandusky made direct eye contact, but McQueary said nothing to him. 
Instead, he promptly left the locker room and retreated to his personal 
office on another floor of the building to call his father, John 
McQueary, for advice on how to proceed.  
 
Because McQueary said nothing to Sandusky, the first actual 
talk about the shower incident occurred when McQueary spoke with his 
father by phone. When asked by his father what was wrong, McQueary 
provided an emotional and euphemistic response. John McQueary 
recounted the conversation this way:  
 
He says, "I saw Coach Sandusky in the shower with a little boy." 
He says, "first I heard it and," he said, "I knew that something 
was going wrong." And he said, "I followed—looked into the 
locker room and saw him there with a little boy." (DC, pp. 143)  
 
McQueary drove to his father's home that evening where he further 
discussed the incident with his father and a family friend, Jonathan 
Dranov. McQueary's account of his discussion with his father reflected 
nearly identical euphemistic language: "I said I just saw Coach 
Sandusky in the showers with a boy and what I saw was wrong and 
sexual." In both accounts, the actual words were "in the shower[s] 
with a boy." While it may be inferred that there was something sexual 
occurring (and McQueary's testimony claims that he used the word 
sexual), "with a boy" is euphemistic and leaves much room for 
ambiguity; the only thing unequivocal was that Sandusky was not 
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alone. Being "with" someone could be purely innocent (e.g., an adult 
and child showering after a workout), predatory (as McQueary testified 
in court), or anywhere in between.  
 
McQueary was advised by his father to contact Paterno and 
report the incident. The following morning, McQueary called Paterno at 
home and told him he had something important to tell him. Paterno 
initially attempted to halt communication, saying, "I don't have a job 
for you. And if that's what it's about, don't bother coming over." When 
McQueary assured him that it was not about a job, Paterno relented. 
McQueary drove to Paterno's home, where he relayed to Paterno in a 
10-minute conversation what he had witnessed the night before. 
Paterno's recollection of the conversation was retold by his biographer: 
"Paterno remembered McQueary's nervousness more vividly than 
anything else. He remembered telling McQueary more than once to 
calm down as they sat at the kitchen table, McQueary had a hard time 
catching his breath" (Posnanski, 2012, p. 271). Whether it was 
because of the emotionality of witnessing an assault, the fear of 
reporting bad news upward, or the face threat involved in discussing a 
taboo topic, McQueary was not very direct. McQueary's recollection of 
the words he relayed to the coach were similar to those he shared with 
his father: "[I said] I had saw Jerry with a young boy in the shower 
and that it was way over the lines" (DC, p. 24).  
 
Again, McQueary's language was euphemistic. But he assumed 
that its meaning was clear. "I had told him—and I want to make sure 
I'm clear—I told him what I had seen, again, on the surface. I made 
sure he knew it was sexual and that it was wrong, and there was no 
doubt about that. I did not go into gross detail about the actual act" 
[emphasis added] (CC4, p. 205). But while McQueary testified that he 
has "no doubt" (CC4, p. 205) he saw Sandusky engaged in intercourse 
with the young boy, those were not the words he used. His intent to 
make sure Paterno "knew it was wrong" did not match his tentative 
and ambiguous language choices. McQueary explained, "I didn't feel 
comfortable using those terms ["anal sex"] and I didn't explain those 
details or use those terms in talking with those men [Paterno, John 
McQueary] out of respect and probably my own embarrassment, to be 
frank with you" (CC4, pp. 205-206). Repeatedly, McQueary 
emphasized that it was respect for Paterno that caused him to dilute 
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his language choices—even though he believed Paterno "needed" and 
"deserved" to know about the assault. McQueary says, "Out of respect 
and just not getting into detail with someone like Coach Paterno. I 
would not have done it" (DC, p. 25). When pressed further, McQueary 
still held to the belief that it was better to be euphemistic than clear. 
For example, when asked whether he used the term "anal 
intercourse," McQueary said, "I gave a brief description of what I saw. 
You don't—ma'am—you don't go to Coach Paterno or at least in my 
mind I don't go to Coach Paterno and go into great detail of sexual 
acts. I would have never done that with him ever" (DC, pp. 73-74). In 
cross-examination, McQueary admitted to avoiding less ambiguous 
terms including "sodomy," "anal intercourse," "anal sodomy," "anal," 
"anal sex," "crime," "assault," "rape," or "intercourse" (DC, pp. 25, 71-
72, 102). He qualified the specificity of his report, saying that he 
"probably used the word sexual" [emphasis added] (DC, p. 102). 
Despite his use of euphemism and avoidance of more direct language, 
McQueary insisted that Paterno understood it was sexual in nature.  
 
Paterno claimed otherwise. In his grand jury testimony, Paterno 
relayed his understanding of the report, saying, "Well, he had seen a 
person, an older—not an older, but a mature person who was fondling, 
whatever you might call it—I'm not sure what the term would be—a 
young boy" (DC, p. 175). When asked if "fondling" was the actual term 
used, Paterno revealed the ambiguous nature of McQueary's account: 
"Well, I don't know what you would call it. Obviously, he [Sandusky] 
was doing something with the youngster. It was a sexual nature. I'm 
not sure exactly what it was" (DC, p. 175). Despite not understanding 
what McQueary was reporting (i.e., fondling and raping are different 
acts), Paterno did nothing to clarify his understanding because of the 
discomfort of the situation. In his grand jury testimony, he explained:  
 
I didn't push Mike to describe exactly what it was because he 
was very upset. Obviously, I was in a little bit of a dilemma 
since Mr. Sandusky was not working for me anymore. So I 
told—I didn't go any further than that except I knew Mike was 
upset and I knew some kind of inappropriate action was being 
taken by Jerry Sandusky with a youngster. (DC, pp. 175-176)  
 
Speaking to his biographer, Paterno discussed what he took away from 
the conversation. He said, "I thought he saw them horsing around. 
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Maybe he thought he saw some fondling. I don't know about any of 
this stuff." (Posnanski, 2012, p. 272). Instead of trying to ascertain 
exactly what McQueary had witnessed, verifying whether a young boy 
was indeed fondled (or raped, as McQueary's court room testimony 
indicates) in a locker room, or demanding that McQueary be more 
direct in his report, Paterno responded by simply stopping the 
conversation. Paterno said, "I told him he didn't have to tell me 
anything else" (Posnanski, 2012, p. 272) and "You did what was right; 
you told me" (DC, p. 176). The conversation ended when Paterno 
thanked McQueary for reporting what he had witnessed and promised 
him that he would take care of it.  
 
The next step in the chain of command for reporting the assault 
fell to Paterno. Sometime that weekend, Paterno contacted athletic 
director Curley, and arranged a meeting for Sunday, February 11, in 
which he informed Curley and vice president Schultz of McQueary's 
report. Paterno recalled his initial report to Curley: "I called him and I 
said, 'hey, we got a problem,' and I explained the problem to him" 
(DC, p. 177). Paterno was not asked to recount to the grand jury 
exactly how he described the "problem," but instead simply agreed 
that he "passed along substantially the same information that Mr. 
McQueary had given" him (DC, p. 177). Schultz recalled the 
conversation this way: "He indicated that someone observed some 
behavior in the football locker room that was disturbing" (DC, p. 206). 
Curley described the encounter with Paterno being a face-to-face 
meeting with Paterno, Curley, and Schultz. According to Curley, 
Paterno reported that an assistant football coach went into the locker 
room in the evening and that "the individual heard and saw, I guess, 
two people in the shower, in the shower area… He was uncomfortable 
with that and at that point he felt it was something he should report to 
Coach Paterno. Coach Paterno relayed that information to Gary 
[Schultz] and I" (DC, p. 181). Curley's use of "two people in the 
shower" camouflages any suspicion of sexual assault. As further 
evidence of the invisibility of euphemism, the attorney (for the 
prosecution) seemed satisfied with Curley's vague response and did 
not ask him to elaborate any further.  
 
Yet, Curley and Schultz must have understood the coded, 
euphemistic language to be something more insidious than two people 
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simply showering together. On Sunday, February 11, shortly after 
hearing Paterno's second-hand account, Schultz contacted attorney 
Wendell Courtney—who was the independent legal counsel for Penn 
State and The Second Mile (the nonprofit organization for 
underprivileged youth, of which Sandusky was the founder)—to seek 
counsel on "reporting of suspected child abuse" (FR, Exhibit 5A). Then 
the following day, Monday, Schultz and Curley called a "heads up" 
meeting with Spanier to alert him of the situation. Spanier said in a 
prepared written statement, "The report was that Jerry Sandusky was 
seen in an athletic locker room facility showering with one of his 
Second Mile youth, after a workout, and that they were "horsing 
around" (or "engaged in horseplay")" (FR, Exhibit 2J).  
 
Spanier asserted that he asked two follow-up questions: "are 
you sure that is how it was described to you, as horsing around?" and 
"are you sure that that is all that was reported?" (FR, Exhibit 2J). Even 
though Spanier is being charged with perjury and this particular 
statement is a key point of contention, it is indeed plausible that 
Curley and Schultz reported someone had witnessed Sandusky 
"horsing around" with another young boy in the shower. Spanier's 
response is suggests a desire to hide behind coded, euphemistic 
language. Instead of asking questions to clarify (e.g., "What do you 
mean "horsing around"? "If all that happened is innocent 'horsing 
around,' why are you telling me about it?" "What other details were 
reported?"), Spanier accepted the euphemism for its most innocuous 
meaning.  
 
Curley and Schultz also scheduled a meeting with McQueary to 
hear his account of the event directly. In the estimated 15-minute 
meeting, which was held approximately February 20, McQueary 
claimed, "I told them that I saw Jerry in the showers with a young boy 
and that what I had seen was extremely sexual and over the lines and 
it was wrong" (DC, p. 32). When pressed further, McQueary said, "I 
would have said that Jerry was in there in very close proximity behind 
a young boy with his arms wrapped around him…. I would have said I 
heard slapping sounds…. I would have made it clear that it was in the 
shower and they were naked" (DC, pp. 33-34). Although McQueary 
was clear in his testimony—at least in regard to what he would have 
said (his peculiar phrasing "I would have said," which is not typical of 
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how he talked in the rest of his testimony, raises some doubts as to 
whether he actually vocalized some of the details)—he equivocated 
about his language choices. "Again, I would not have used some of the 
words that you previously mentioned ["sodomy," "anal intercourse"], 
but I would have described that it was extremely sexual and that I 
thought that some kind of intercourse was going on" (DC, p. 34).  
 
Curley's account of McQueary's side of the story was quite 
different. He said, "My recollection was that Mike could hear there 
were people in, they were in the shower area, that they were horsing 
around, that they were playful, and that it just did not feel 
appropriate" (DC, p. 183). He continued to paint a picture of behavior 
that, while perhaps immature, was not sexual. In fact, when asked if 
the conduct reported was that of a sexual nature, Curley flatly denied 
that McQueary reported "any kind" of sexual contact (DC, p. 184). 
Instead he replied, "My recollection was that they were kind of 
wrestling, there was body contact, and they were horsing around" (DC, 
p. 184). In comparison, Schultz said of the same conversation, "I 
believe that he said that he saw something that he felt was 
inappropriate between Jerry and a boy" (DC, p. 226). He, too, denied 
explicit claims of sexual abuse had been made by McQueary, asserting 
that the reports received by both Paterno and McQueary were very 
general and lacking details. Schultz claimed that he concluded from 
the meeting with McQueary that "I had the impression that it was 
inappropriate…. I had the feeling that there was perhaps some kind of 
wrestling around activity and maybe Jerry might have grabbed the 
young boy's genitals or something of that sort is kind of the impression 
that I had" (DC, p. 211). Even though he acknowledged that there 
may have been genital contact, Schultz denied there were sexual 
overtones. Instead, he chocked it up to Sandusky's tendency to be a 
clown and "the kind of horsing around that he does" (DC, p. 226):  
 
You know, I don't know what sexual conduct's definition to be, 
but I told you that my impression was—you know, Jerry was the 
kind of guy that he regularly kind of like physically wrestled 
people. He would punch you in the arm. He would slap you on 
the back. He would grab you and get you in a headlock, etc. 
That was a fairly common clowning around thing. I had the 
impression that maybe something like that was going on in the 
locker room and perhaps in the course of that, that somebody 
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might have grabbed the genitals, that Jerry might have grabbed 
the genitals of the young boy. I had no impression that it was 
anything more serious than that. That was my impression at the 
time. (DC, p. 223-224)  
 
The meeting between the three men was brief. Despite calling 
McQueary in for the specific purpose of learning what he saw, there 
was no indication that Curley and Schultz took the matter seriously. All 
parties involved—McQueary, Schultz, and Curley—agreed that 
euphemistic language ruled the encounter. Specifically, Schultz and 
Curley allowed McQueary's euphemistic language to go unchecked. 
They did not ask perception-checking questions to confirm their 
personal assessments of the situation. And most troubling of all, 
Schultz got an impression from talking to McQueary that Sandusky 
may have touched a boy's genitals, but did not seek more information 
from the very eye witness who could have given the necessary insight 
to help them determine the best course of action. Instead, Penn 
State's top leaders concluded the meeting by reassuring McQueary 
that "they thought it was serious, what I was saying, and that they 
would investigate it or look into it closely, and they said they would 
follow-up with me" (DC, p. 35).  
 
Throughout the reporting of sexual abuse, all parties appeared 
threatened by the details they had to reveal. As a result, rather than 
speaking plainly and unequivocally about accusations of abuse, Penn 
State personnel relied on the euphemism "horsing around," a 
seemingly innocent term denoting rough or boisterous play. Notably, it 
is not fully clear how or when the euphemism first emerged—or who 
was the first to utter the expression. While the first record in court 
testimony and investigative reports indicates its appearance at the 
February 12 meeting when Curley and Schultz first reported to Spanier 
that Sandusky was caught "horsing around" or "engaged in horseplay," 
it is conceivable that Paterno was the individual responsible for 
introducing the euphemism. Paterno recounted to his biographer that 
he concluded after his meeting with McQueary on February 10 that he 
thought that McQueary saw Sandusky and a child "horsing around." 
Given the vague testimony Paterno later provided in court with regard 
to the words he used to report to his superiors (i.e., he simply agreed 
that he reported basically the same information McQueary had given 
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him), perhaps "horsing around" had taken hold prior to its first 
officially recorded use.  
 
Regardless, by the time the Curley and Schultz went back to 
McQueary for a first-hand account of what happened, they were no 
longer looking to learn what had happened. They simply were seeking 
confirmation of their euphemism "horsing around" and its most 
innocuous possible interpretation. The course of (in)action that was 
already being put into place was dependent upon that shared 
interpretation—or at least a plausible account of that shared 
interpretation, which functioned as a sensemaking vocabulary for 
understanding the events (see Rorty, 1989; Weick et al., 2005). Then, 
absent any unvarnished and unambiguous details from McQueary, 
Curley and Schultz had the wiggle room necessary to claim their 
preferred meaning of the euphemism and chart their course of action.  
 
Responding Euphemisms: Leaders Determining Course 
of (In)Action  
 
A second cluster of euphemisms used throughout the 
organizational response was just as problematic as the euphemisms 
used to describe the sexual assault itself. Following the initial reporting 
of the sexual assault by Curley and Schultz to Spanier on February 12, 
the three leaders held a follow-up meeting on February 25, in which 
handwritten notes indicated a course of action was decided. The action 
plan included informing the chair of The Second Mile, reporting to the 
Department of Welfare, and "Tell[ing] J.S. to avoid bringing children 
alone into Lasch Bldg" (FR, Exhibit 5E). A follow-up email written on 
February 26 by Schultz to Curley and Spanier reiterated the basic plan, 
stating the need to "talk with the subject [Sandusky] ASAP regarding 
the future appropriate use of the University facility" (FR, Exhibit 5E).  
 
On February 27, Curley responded to Schultz and Spanier, 
indicating that he talked with Paterno and proposed a different course 
of action that struck external reporting from the plan. He said:  
 
I am uncomfortable with what we agreed were the next steps. I 
am having trouble with going to everyone, but the person 
involved [Sandusky]. I think I would be more comfortable 
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meeting with the person and tell him about the information we 
received….I will let him know that his guests are not permitted 
to use our facilities. (FR, Exhibit 5G)  
 
Curley's hesitancy to communicate the accusation to external 
organizations (which have power over Penn State leaders), is akin to 
the hesitancy that subordinates may experience in reporting critical 
upward communication. Spanier agreed with Curley's assessment and 
empathized with his discomfort. He endorsed Curley's new plan, 
saying, "It [the revised plan] requires you to go a step further and 
means that your conversation will be all the more difficult, but I 
admire your willingness to do that and I am supportive" (FR, Exhibit 
5G). Schultz endorsed the plan as well.  
 
In his prepared written statement, Spanier described reiterated the 
preferred euphemistic language proposed by Curley:  
 
I asked that Tim [Curley] meet with Sandusky to tell him that 
he must never again bring youth into the showers. We further 
agreed that we should inform the Second Mile president that we 
were directing Jerry accordingly and furthermore that we did not 
wish Second Mile youth to be in our showers. (FR, Exhibit 2J)  
 
Schultz also used the pervasive euphemism that emphasized proper 
use of facilities, saying, "I think we decided it would be appropriate to 
just say to Jerry that you shouldn't be bringing the Second Mile kids 
onto campus in the football building" (DC, p. 212).  
 
One of the critiques launched by the Freeh Report was that 
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier used "generic references" and "code" 
words in their emails when discussing the Sandusky incident (FR, p. 
73). But what is particularly striking about their euphemistic language 
is not just that it was vague (i.e., avoiding putting specific details into 
writing, including names), but that their particular choice of 
euphemism removed any suggestion of criminal activity and radically 
shifted the frame of culpability. Whereas McQueary's report of sexual 
assault in euphemistic terms (e.g., "with a boy", "over the lines") may 
have obfuscated the criminality and severity of what he had witnessed, 
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier's euphemistic language shifted the 
wrongdoing from Sandusky assaulting young children (on campus and 
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elsewhere) to improper use of university facilities. The problem was 
reframed as Sandusky bringing "children alone into the Lasch 
Building," Sandusky not engaging in "appropriate use of the University 
facility," and his "guests" gaining unauthorized access to facilities.  
 
Additionally, these euphemisms removed any remaining 
attention away from the victim and his needs for protection and 
support. Their choice of words rebranded Sandusky's victim as a 
guest—and an unauthorized one at that—who took advantage of Penn 
State football facilities. In this way, the boy was a conspirator 
alongside Sandusky. The boy did not pay an admission fee to use the 
equipment and could potentially be seen at greater fault because he, 
unlike Sandusky, was not an authorized user of the facility. Moreover, 
talking about Sandusky's "guests" and "children," both in the plural, 
further anonymized the victim from the night of February 9, 2001. The 
boy no longer was a particular victim who had to be identified and 
helped, but one of many possible "freeloaders" who had to be stopped 
from gaining a benefit not due to them. In effect, the euphemism 
positioned Penn State University as the party being put at risk and/or 
harmed.  
 
The meeting between Curley and Sandusky was scheduled for 
March 5, nearly a full month after McQueary initially reported the 
assault. In court testimony, Curley recalled his conversation with 
Sandusky:  
 
When I met with Jerry, because I was uncomfortable with the 
information we received, I indicated to him that in addition to 
reporting it to the executive director of the Second Mile, that I 
did not want him using our athletic facilities for workout 
purposes and bringing any young people with him. He was not 
to use our facilities with young people." (DC, p. 186)  
 
Penn State's General Counsel's notes from a March 2011 conversation 
with Spanier reflect that Spanier "[b]umped into Tim Curley and Tim 
advised that he had a conversation with Sandusky not to bring children 
into the shower again" (FR, p. 77).  
 
There were two elements of the response were particularly 
troubling. First, the mandate to Sandusky was not to stop sexually 
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abusing children, but to stop "showering with" them or "using our 
athletic facilities for workout purposes." Again, as it is presented, the 
problem is framed as Sandusky and his guests taking unfair advantage 
of Penn State facilities. The euphemism camouflaged the real reason 
behind the prohibition and removed ethical judgment from the 
situation. Second, there was a lack of urgency in disciplining Sandusky 
that can be traced back to euphemism. If the problem was that 
Sandusky's "horsing around" could be putting himself and/or a child at 
risk of a slip and fall accident, it was an issue that could have been 
handled properly with low urgency and a casual meeting. If the 
problem was that Sandusky was inviting his "guests" to "use" 
university facilities in an inappropriate and unauthorized way, it was 
an issue that could have been handled properly with low urgency and a 
casual meeting—or avoided altogether if deemed there was not 
enough harm to the university to warrant addressing the problem. But 
the real issue was that Sandusky was sexually abusing boys on Penn 
State property. Therefore, it was an issue that required immediate, 
decisive action and required reporting to outside authorities for further 
investigation  
 
Furthermore, the proposed prohibition was highly ineffectual. 
Because of the euphemistic language of not "bringing children to the 
shower" and intentionally circumventing any mention of sexual abuse, 
there was no way to create a common understanding or communicate 
the gravity of the prohibition. The order was not truly enforceable as 
only Sandusky and a few administrators who rarely, if ever, were in 
the football facilities were aware of the prohibition. Individuals who 
could have helped to enforce the ban (e.g., janitors, assistant coaches, 
other athletics staff) were not informed of it. Schultz described the 
enforcement mechanism as the "honor system" and said that Curley 
trusted Sandusky to obey the request (DC, p. 234).  
 
Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the euphemisms 
favored by Curley, Schultz, and Spanier were lost on Sandusky. 
According to Sandusky's attorney, Curley and Sandusky had a 
conversation in which they discussed the prohibition on taking children 
into the showers on campus:  
 
Sandusky's counsel said Curley told Sandusky that they had 
heard Sandusky had been in the shower with a young child, and 
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someone felt this was inappropriate. According to Sandusky's 
counsel, Curley never used the word "sex" or "intercourse" 
during the discussion. Counsel said Sandusky offered to give the 
child's name to Curley, but Curley did not accept this invitation. 
Counsel also said Curley told Sandusky he did not want 
Sandusky to bring children to the shower any more. Sandusky's 
counsel said no one accused Sandusky of abusing kids. (FR, p. 
77)  
 
In a final step, Curley met with The Second Mile executive 
director Jack Raykovitz sometime in March. In that meeting, Curley 
reported that someone had seen Sandusky in the locker room with a 
young boy and was "uncomfortable" with the situation. Curley told 
Raykovitz that he had discussed the incident with Sandusky and 
determined that nothing inappropriate had occurred that that it was a 
"non-issue;" however, to avoid the risk of bad publicity, Sandusky 
would no longer be permitted to bring children onto the Penn State 
campus. Curley asked Raykovitz to emphasize the prohibition to 
Sandusky (FR, pp. 64, 78). Yet, when Raykovitz repeated the 
prohibition of bringing children on campus, Sandusky retorted that it 
applied only to the locker rooms (FR, p. 78).  
 
Contrary to the original plan that proposed making an official 
report to the Department of Public Welfare (and in opposition to state 
law that mandates reporting of suspected child abuse to law 
enforcement; see Cons. Stat. Tit. 23, § 6311), no additional reports 
were made by Penn State leaders and, for all intents and purposes, 
the case was closed. The decision not to report the assault witnessed 
and reported by McQueary is a key issue in the criminal prosecution of 
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier for failure to report, endangering the 
welfare of a child, obstructing administration of law, and criminal 
conspiracy. The three men attempted to shield themselves and their 
inaction by the euphemistic language. For example, when asked in 
court if there was a conversation about whether to go to law 
enforcement, Curley responded, "At the time I don't recall that 
because, again, I didn't feel—at least I didn't feel personally that any 
criminal activity had occurred" (DC, p. 199). Likewise, Schultz offered 
similar reasoning for failure to refer the case to the police. He said, 
"My recollection was that he [McQueary] was uncomfortable they were 
in the shower and it was just the two of them [Sandusky and the boy] 
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and that they were horsing around and inappropriate conduct." Schultz 
concluded, "There was no indication that it was [criminal]" (DC, p. 
231).  
 
The extent of ethical fading enabled by euphemism in the case 
can be seen in how Curley defended himself and his decisions. When 
pushed to explain why an act that he did not view as criminal was 
reported to The Second Mile, Curley stated, "based on what I heard 
that was reported to me, I just didn't feel it was appropriate that Jerry 
would be in a shower area with a young person. Whether it was 
horsing around or however you want to describe it. I just didn't think 
that would be appropriate and shouldn't occur" (DC, p. 200). He 
defended his entire course of action, drawing from the same 
euphemism:  
 
I was not aware of anything sexual. So I didn't feel that it 
warranted that [police investigation] and I felt my actions were 
appropriate. But I was not aware that there was sexual activity. 
[Q: If you didn't think this was sexual in nature or criminal in 
nature, then why did you take the action of barring Sandusky 
from bringing youths onto the university property?] Because I 
didn't think it was appropriate that he would be using our 
facilities, having young people in there in the evening, and that 
you're in a shower area horsing around with a young person. 
(DC, p. 197)  
 
Paterno, too, defended his inaction by recounting to his biographer 
that if McQueary had told him he saw Sandusky raping a young boy, 
"We would have gone to the police right then and there, no questions 
asked" (Posnanski, 2012, p. 277).  
 
Despite their protestations that they would have done the right 
thing if they had only known the truth, the bitter tragedy here is that 
all these men appear to have known that it was more than "horsing 
around." Paterno, Curley, Schultz, and Spanier were well aware of the 
1998 case where Sandusky had been reported to the police for 
showering with and inappropriately touching a young boy. Although no 
criminal charges were pressed in that case, a 95-page police report 
was filed and red flags were raised. At the time of McQueary's report, 
Schultz contacted police chief Tom Harmon to check on the records of 
that case (FR, Exhibit 5D). Schultz immediately contacted the 
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university's outside legal counsel, Wendell Courtney, to have a 
conference on "reporting of suspected child abuse" (FR, p. 69, Exhibit 
5A). They hid files in their offices. They communicated in coded 
language in their emails. But over time, as the case grew colder, 
ethical concerns faded even further from view. Through euphemism, 
the leaders found ways to justify their actions and inactions, ways to 
justify their interpretation. Tragically, between February 2001 when 
the crime was first reported to when the criminal charges were 
launched and Sandusky was arrested, at least two more boys were 
assaulted by Sandusky in the Penn State locker room and another four 
boys at locations off of Penn State's campus. Sandusky may have 
stopped taking "guests" to the showers, but it did not stop his criminal 
behavior.2  
 
Discussion  
 
By situating language in a central position in our analysis, we 
demonstrate that the specific words people use are of utmost 
consequence for ethical action (see Bisel et al., 2011; MacKenzie, 
2000; Redding, 1996). The findings of this study provide evidence of 
the central role euphemism played in a decade-long cover-up of the 
sexual abuse scandal at Penn State University. We described how 
euphemistic language was used to shield an eye-witness from personal 
embarrassment and emotional discomfort when reporting what he 
saw, and then how euphemisms were co-opted by top leaders to 
justify a chain of (in)action that protected them from the rational 
discomfort provoked by legal risks and moral obligations of responding 
to sexual abuse charges. In short, euphemism was used to protect 
Penn State's personnel and the organization at large—even though it 
came at the expense of leaving boys in harm's way.  
 
Although reporting of abuse followed a proper internal chain of 
command—with the glaring omission of filing a police report—there 
was a serious and significant breakdown in communication whereby 
the essence of the message was lost and/or (perhaps willfully) 
distorted. In particular, the euphemism "horsing around" played a 
pivotal role in how the case unfolded over time. From the very 
beginning, McQueary spoke in face-saving, euphemistic terms as he 
reported the assault he had witnessed to Paterno. Even though it was 
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understood at the time that the action was "inappropriate" and likely 
sexual, there was much ambiguity in the words used. The ambiguity 
was reflected in Paterno's confusion over what happened, as he 
testified in court that it was "fondling, whatever you might call it" and 
then recounted to his biographer that he understood McQueary's 
report to be that Sandusky and the boy were "horsing around." 
Paterno, highly uncomfortable with discussing the taboo topic, relayed 
McQueary's report to Curley and Schultz, who in turn reported it to 
Spanier.  
 
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier then co-opted the "horsing around" 
euphemism with dire consequence. They framed the official 
organizational response around an innocuous—yet patently false—
interpretation that Sandusky simply showered with a boy after hours 
and engaged in "horseplay." Certainly horseplay is inappropriate and 
could pose undue risks to the university: someone could get hurt (e.g., 
slip and fall on the wet floor) and an adult being alone in a shower 
with an underage male could open up the risk for (false) allegations of 
improper conduct. Consequently, leaders' ensuing use of euphemisms 
such as "appropriate use of facilities" and "guests" framed their 
concern around risk management for the university and abuse of Penn 
State's facilities, not the sexual abuse of a boy.  
 
But it is patently obvious that the boy with Sandusky was not a 
guest. He was a victim of sexual assault on Penn State's campus by a 
person who, although no longer technically employed by the 
university, still retained official affiliation. By acknowledging the boy in 
this scenario as a victim instead of a euphemistic "guest"—
interchangeable with any other person who might enter the football 
facilities—the criminality of the case is foregrounded and ethical and 
legal obligations of the university can no longer be faded from view. 
Penn State leaders had an immediate, pressing, and non-negotiable 
duty to respond. The laws in the state of Pennsylvania required that 
they report the suspected abuse of a minor to the police. Penn State 
University policies required them to identify the victim, provide 
support services, and be an advocate for the victim. Additionally, 
Curley, Schultz, and Spanier were required to cooperate with 
subpoenas and other police investigations; to cooperate with external 
child welfare organizations and their independent investigations; and 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 114, No. 4 (June 2013): pg. 551-569. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article 
to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer. 
32 
 
to testify in court to what they knew. Most importantly, they had a 
duty—if not legally, at least morally—to act swiftly to ensure that the 
child was clear of immediate harm and to take decisive actions to 
prevent any future harm. Yet none of these things occurred. Emails 
were sent, meetings were held, attorneys were consulted, and one 
month after the initial report, Curley simply asked Sandusky in a 
private meeting not to bring underage guests for workouts and 
showers—a banal and euphemistic request enforceable only by the 
honor system.  
 
Yes, the silence and cover-up of the abuse committed by 
Sandusky was scandalous. But so, too, was Penn State leaders' use of 
euphemism. In fact, euphemism may have done even more damage 
than silence. Silence quashed proper criminal investigation and, at 
least for a while, protected the university from bad publicity and 
shielded leaders from public scrutiny (Freeh, 2012). But the use of 
euphemism appears to have silenced the quiet voices, too—those 
voices of conscience that sit on the shoulders of people who could 
have spoken up, who could have stopped the abuse sooner. By 
reframing the meaning of the initial report into something more 
palatable, euphemism silenced the voices that said "this behavior is 
criminal." By encouraging mindless decision-making, it silenced the 
voices that asked "are we doing the right thing for all parties 
involved?" and "what are the ethical implications of our choices?" By 
providing a psychological shield for wrongdoing, it silenced the voices 
that whispered at night "it's not too late to speak up." In short, it was 
euphemism that enabled leaders to act unethically and to deceive 
themselves that they had behaved appropriately.  
 
Moreover, we argue that euphemism—whether as a deliberate 
or emergent discursive move (see Moldoveanu, 2009)—acted as a 
disguised retort to critical upward communication. While retorts 
typically are characterized as sharp or angry responses, the 
euphemism "horsing around" operated much differently. Rather than 
responding to subordinates' accusations of sexual abuse with outright 
denials, threats or reprimands to subordinates, or attempts to recruit 
subordinates into a deliberate cover-up, euphemism was a calm and 
quiet response that silenced dissent by creating an illusion of care and 
concern. Specifically, Penn State leaders were able to listen to 
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McQueary, acknowledge their "shared understanding," and assure him 
they were working to fix the problem. Put another way, euphemism 
was a systematically distorted communication that enabled leaders to 
"listen to, act on, and speak about" something (i.e., stopping 
boisterous play) without having to listen to, speak about, and act on 
the high-stakes, ethically-laden something (i.e., criminal sexual 
conduct perpetrated against minors). Therefore, they created a 
reasonable belief that McQueary's expression of critical upward 
communication was well-received. As such, there was no apparent 
need on McQueary's part to pursue further internal dissent or whistle-
blowing (Baron, 2013; Gutierrez & McLaren, 2012; Kassing, 2011), 
thereby halting any further critical upward communication.  
 
Contributions and Future Directions  
 
In this study, we heeded MacKenzie's (2000) call to place 
language at the center of the study of organizational ethics. In addition 
to the insights we offered into understanding more fully the role that 
communication played in the Penn State sexual abuse scandal, we 
have made contributions to euphemism research more broadly. The 
core contributions center on organizational euphemism, which remains 
a largely understudied topic (see Stein, 1998). For each contribution, 
we identify a set of questions to shape future research directions.  
 
First, we demonstrate some of the unique effects of 
organizational euphemism, particularly with regard to organizational 
ethics. Previous research has shown that euphemism use can impair 
ethical decision-making by framing an issue in more palatable terms, 
by encouraging mindless processing, and by providing a shield against 
psychological discomfort and material consequences. This case 
analysis provides a vivid example of those processes. Taken to an 
organizational level, however, there are additional effects to consider. 
Most notably, while euphemism may begin as a substitute term, it 
easily can be transformed into a metaphor for guiding organizational 
thought and action (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Vignone, 2012). 
Operating as a metaphor, then, organizational euphemism can extend 
its power by shaping meaning of related phenomena. In this particular 
case, not only was sexual abuse hidden, but the victim was rebranded 
as an unauthorized guest, culpability was shifted to Sandusky and the 
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victim as equal agents in wrongdoing, and the university was 
positioned as the true victim of facility abuse. Consequently, not only 
did moral considerations of the real issue fade from view, but attention 
shifted toward a different problem—one that could ethically justify the 
course of action being taken (i.e., "professional blind spots," see 
Weick, 1995, p. 113). Future research can address several questions 
in this regard. What is the connection between euphemism and 
metaphor across organizations? How might metaphor conceal and 
reveal moral considerations? What effect does euphemistic and 
metaphorical language have on organizational members' ability to 
process ethical considerations?  
 
Second, we provide preliminary insights into the process by 
which euphemism moves from an interpersonal to an organizational 
level. To begin, while it is unclear exactly who introduced the 
euphemism "horsing around," it appears it was by one of the top 
leaders (i.e., Paterno, Curley, Schultz, Spanier), who each had 
legitimate power due his position in the university. Whether "horsing 
around" was a deliberate discursive move from the start or simply 
emerged, the euphemism gained traction through leaders' willing 
acceptance of the phrase (i.e., no evidence exists that its meaning or 
its appropriateness ever was questioned). From there, the euphemism 
was repeated in internal conversations, recorded into written records 
of the organization, and relayed to external audiences by public 
figures.  
 
But more than mere repetition of responding euphemisms, the 
process hinged upon compatibility with the earliest reporting 
euphemisms in this case. That is, the feasibility of using "horsing 
around" to chart organizational action depended upon earlier 
ambiguity (e.g., McQueary's use of "over the line," "with a boy"). 
Indeed, had McQueary's report to Paterno contained explicit language 
(e.g., "I witnessed Sandusky raping a young boy"), the transformation 
of "horsing around" from interpersonal to organizational euphemism 
would have been much more difficult, if not impossible. Top leaders 
were able to draw upon a vocabulary of "horsing around" to make 
sense of and develop a more palatable narrative of the accusations 
against Sandusky (see Rorty, 1989; Weick et al., 2005). This insight 
into the process raises questions for future research. What other 
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processes are involved in establishing an organizational euphemism? 
Why do some euphemisms persist and others fall out of favor? Would 
organizational members with less power possess the same ability to 
introduce an organizational euphemism?  
 
Third, organizational euphemism can become embedded into 
institutional memory (Linde, 1999) and provoke individuals to accept 
decisions made and/or set precedent for how to respond to similar 
events in the future. For instance, given the propensity for 
organizational record-keeping—particularly, but not exclusively, in 
large organizations—organizational euphemisms are likely to become 
part of the written record of the organization. In this way, euphemism 
can serve as an official record against which actions can be defended 
to various stakeholders. For instance, leaders can draw upon 
euphemism to justify their course of action to stakeholders, providing 
an account that bleaches ethical considerations from decision-
triggering events. Similarly, after original decision-makers have left an 
organization or if enough time has lapsed to cloud individual memory, 
written documents can serve as an official record of what occurred. 
When records are imbued with euphemisms, individuals accessing 
those internal documents may take contents at face value without 
additional interrogation of the ethics of a particular decision. This type 
of record-keeping can have far-reaching implications, such as leading 
to plausible deniability on the part of upper-level decision makers (see 
Eisenberg, 1984; Seeger & Ulmer, 2003). Researchers should address 
further the connection between euphemism and institutional memory. 
What are the processes by which written and oral accounts of ethical 
decisions get embedded into institutional memory? What role do 
organizational records play in setting precedent for future ethical 
deliberation? How might written records be analyzed to evaluate 
ethical decision-making?  
 
Finally, our findings provide evidence of how euphemism can 
function as a disguised retort to critical upward communication (see 
Kassing, 2011; Morrison, 2011; Tourish & Robson, 2006). There are a 
range of motivations as to why someone would engage in the risky 
behavior of expressing critical upward communication—from simply 
following protocol, to clearing his or her conscience, to seeking 
resolution to a perceived problem. Particularly in the case of the latter, 
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an individual likely will be looking for assurances that the situation has 
been resolved (or at least an absence of information indicating that the 
situation remains unresolved). Direct retorts such as denials of the 
truth of claims (e.g., "That can't possibly be true") or soliciting 
cooperation in a cover-up (e.g., "We count on you to keep this matter 
between us, right?") would be strong signals of resistance to the 
critical upward communication, which could incite further action on the 
part of the messenger (e.g., going to a higher level in the 
organization, whistle-blowing to an external audience; see Baron, 
2013; Gutierrez & McLaren, 2012). In contrast, using a shared and 
uncontested euphemism allows leadership to present itself as being 
appropriately concerned and responsive to the situation. Just as the 
absence of critical upward communication contributes to leaders' 
inaccurate perceptions of the communication climate in an 
organization (Tourish & Robson, 2006), employees can be led to a 
similar conclusion. Leaders do not have to deny or silence concerns by 
stopping the subordinate from talking; they can collaboratively deny 
and/or silence those concerns by attending to a preferred, innocuous 
meaning. This approach prevents organizational members from 
persisting in critical upward communication as it appears the situation 
is being addressed. Future research should examine the connections 
between euphemism and critical upward communication. What is the 
relationship between euphemism and silence? How might 
organizational actors learn to spot when they are being silenced by 
euphemism? What role has euphemism played in other organizational 
scandals or whistle-blowing cases? How does euphemism as a retort 
impact decision making in organizations?  
 
Practical Implications  
 
There are several practical implications of the present study. 
Most importantly, we highlight the critical need for specific language 
and a cultural script for discussing sexual assaults, particularly those 
involving male sexual assault. The emotional uneasiness and loss for 
words throughout the Penn State case provides evidence of Capers' 
(2011) assertion that male sexual assault is "invisible, or at least un-
articulable" (p. 1259). Perhaps none of these men knew how to put 
into words what they knew. More than a decade after the crime was 
witnessed, and far removed from the locker room where it occurred, 
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McQueary still was embarrassed and struggling to verbalize what he 
saw. This observation is in no way made to justify leaders' claims of 
ignorance and organizational (in)action. However, it seems plausible 
that if McQueary had witnessed Sandusky in the same position with a 
female (especially an adult woman), he may have had words to 
describe what he had seen, as typical sexual scripts and rape scripts 
position perpetrators as male and victims as female (Crome & McCabe, 
2001). Perhaps he would have even had the courage to confront 
Sandusky in the moment as he relied on a common gendered cultural 
script of "saving a damsel in distress" (Phelan, Sanchez, & Broccoli, 
2010). Given that naming a problem is a necessary step in identifying 
and responding to it, a new vocabulary—one that is devoid of sanitized 
clinical or legal descriptions of assault, taboo talk of body parts, and 
"feminized" sexual assault language—may prove helpful in breaking 
the silence on male sexual assault. As one example, some sexual 
assault survivors already are beginning to post online about their 
experiences of being "sanduskied" as a way to draw attention to 
problems of male sexual assault and silence.  
 
Turning to business contexts, people must be sensitized to the 
potential dangers of euphemism and encouraged to use clear and 
precise language across various organizational contexts. Particularly in 
situations that may carry legal ramifications, euphemistic language 
must be abandoned in favor of specificity. Whether it is sexual assault, 
sexual harassment, discrimination, insider trading, improper 
accounting practices, or the like, organizational members have an 
ethical responsibility to speak as clearly as possible. This means that 
individuals need to find the courage to put aside personal 
embarrassment and discomfort when reporting wrongdoing (Jablin, 
2006).  
 
Euphemism poses even bigger challenges for ethical leadership. 
Leaders have an additional ethical responsibility to seek clarity. When 
euphemism or other ambiguous language is used, leaders cannot allow 
assumptions of shared meaning to suffice no matter how 
uncomfortable the topic. Leaders must be held accountable for asking 
tough questions and getting detailed information. They must learn how 
to handle difficult conversations by giving individuals permission (if not 
a mandate) to speak in clear, unequivocal terms—even at the expense 
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of being offensive or using dysphemisms (i.e., impolite, offensive, or 
disagreeable terms). They should not halt difficult conversations for 
the sake of relieving their own or other's discomfort. Not only could 
they be missing important information in the exchange, but the 
information that they learn from these conversations may not meet 
legal standards for specificity. Moreover, leaders carry an ethical 
burden to foster a culture where clear, unequivocal language is 
encouraged (see Seeger & Ulmer, 2003).  
 
Finally, this case provides a moment to reflect upon how 
language and ethics are taught in university settings. Given the 
important role that education plays in socializing future leaders to the 
business world and establishing their tolerance for unethical behaviors 
(see Yu & Zhang, 2006), it is worth a reappraisal of how students are 
being taught to talk. What type of language is rewarded? What type is 
penalized? Moreover, in an era of political correctness and litigation-
sensitivity, are euphemism and niceties encouraged, either implicitly 
or explicitly, while clearer but potentially more offensive words are 
discouraged? It would seem that professionalism and tact can be 
taught in such a way as to promote clarity and avoid obfuscation. 
Furthermore, ethics classes could include units on analyzing language 
use to uncover and address ethical issues that may not be readily 
apparent at first glance.  
 
Conclusion  
 
When Sandusky's charges of sexual abuse were brought to light, 
the media and public at large implored, "Why didn't anyone speak up?" 
The truth is that they were speaking. It was not the silence that was 
damaging in this case, but the words—the euphemistic words—that 
enabled the most harm. The Penn State sexual abuse scandal stands 
as testament to the dangerous, injurious, and violent effects that 
language can have. While euphemism is not inherently bad, it can 
serve less-than-noble purposes, particularly when it is used to signify 
problems rife with ethical concerns and hide unpleasant truths that 
should not be concealed. Stein (1998) warns that the trouble with 
euphemisms is that "we usually recognize—awaken from—them after 
they have done their damage" (p. 1; see also Redding, 1996). Such is 
the case with the Penn State sexual abuse scandal. There, the 
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expression "horsing around" was not a neutral word choice that merely 
privileged polite talk. It was euphemism that enabled unethical 
decision-making by distorting meaning, impeding and misdirecting 
efforts at corrective and preventative action, providing a cover of 
ambiguity to shield administrators from psychological discomfort and 
legal liability, and silencing critical upward communication. Ultimately, 
the inability or unwillingness of key leaders to speak clearly about 
accusations of sexual abuse had dire consequences for the university, 
its leaders, and, most significantly, the boys who were sexually abused 
for years after McQueary's report. In retrospect, it is easy to see the 
extent of the harm condoned, exacerbated, and inflicted by leaders' 
euphemistic language choices. The tragedy of the Penn State sexual 
abuse case should serve as an urgent and far-reaching wakeup call to 
pay much closer and more critical attention in everyday life to the 
power and consequences of language.  
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Notes 
1 One of the striking elements of the courtroom testimony was the 
precise language invoked throughout—ranging from sanitized to 
graphic. In their questioning of witnesses, attorneys used terms 
like "sexual conduct," "body positioning," "body movement," 
"Mr. Sandusky's genitals touching the boy," "erect penis," 
"insertion," and "thrusting his groin into a young boy's rear 
end." Some terms were used to present testimony as matter-of-
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factly as possible; others for dramatic effect. However, it seems 
most probable that the language used to describe the assaults 
outside the court room was far less precise and somewhere 
between the two extremes of sanitized and graphic. 
2 As a postscript to the case, Sandusky attempted to use the "horsing 
around" euphemism as a defense for his actions. When 
questioned by Bob Costas in an NBC interview, Sandusky 
defended himself against McQueary's accusations by saying, 
"Okay. We were showering and horsing around and he [the boy] 
actually turned all the showers on and was actually sliding 
across the floor and we were, as I recall, possibly like snapping 
a towel and horseplay" (Costas, 2011). Of course, the 
euphemism that could sound innocent on the surface takes on a 
much more insidious meaning when taking into consideration 
that Victim 4 testified in criminal proceedings that Sandusky 
would call play fighting and throwing soap suds in the shower, 
often which occurred as a precursor to a sexual assault, 
"horsing around" (CC3, p. 53). 
